一位美國前總統(tǒng)曾經(jīng)說過：“一個(gè)人的名譽(yù)就像一件精美的瓷器,，一旦受損就很難修復(fù),。”正因?yàn)槊u(yù)對(duì)人們?nèi)绱酥匾藗儾艜?huì)不惜一切的保護(hù)它,。
為了檢驗(yàn)這一理論,，并弄清謠言對(duì)當(dāng)事人行為,，尤其是經(jīng)濟(jì)上的慷慨行為的影響，英國研究人員設(shè)計(jì)了一個(gè)有趣的試驗(yàn),。相關(guān)報(bào)道發(fā)表在2008年5月的愛思唯爾期刊《進(jìn)化與人類行為》（Evolution and Human Behavior）上,。
研究人員招募了72名大學(xué)生，他們需要分配10枚籌碼,，可以給別人,，也可以留給自己。從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度考慮,，最優(yōu)策略是把所有10枚籌碼都留給自己,。試驗(yàn)中，一部分受試者被引導(dǎo)相信：其他受試者中,，匿名的第二方會(huì)向第三方透露自己的籌碼分配決定,。此外，一部分上述第三方的身份信息是大家已知的,。這樣,，第三方的聲譽(yù)便有了受損的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。試驗(yàn)結(jié)果顯示,，謠言對(duì)人的行為影響巨大,。那些名譽(yù)受到謠言威脅的受試者，在分配籌碼的過程中表現(xiàn)得更加慷慨,。
這項(xiàng)研究明確表明,，感覺自己正被謠言威脅，名譽(yù)有受損危險(xiǎn),，將促使人們實(shí)施慷慨的親社會(huì)行為,，目的是維護(hù)自己的名譽(yù)。（科學(xué)網(wǎng) 荔濤/編譯）
生物谷推薦原始出處：
Evolution and Human Behavior,，doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.12.002,，Jared Piazza and Jesse M. Bering
Concerns about reputation via gossip promote generous allocations in an economic game
Jared Piazza, a, and Jesse M. Beringa
aInstitute of Cognition and Culture, Queen’s University, Belfast, 2-4 Fitzwilliam St., Nothern Ireland, BT7 1NN, UK
Abstract
In the present study, a modified dictator game was used to test the hypothesis that the threat of gossip would encourage prosocial decision making. All participants were asked to distribute an endowment between themselves and an anonymous second party. Half of the participants were told that the second party would be discussing their economic decision with a third party. For some participants, this third party was someone to whom they had first disclosed personally identifying information. Participants who received the threat of gossip manipulation were more generous than control participants, but only when the third party could personally identify them was this difference significant. These data reveal that at least some prosocial decisions are motivated by actor's reputational concerns—concerns that are directly mediated by language.
